In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the study of the strategic behavior of social media interacting with citizens that form opinions in a democracy. In a world of information and the internet, it becomes imperative for social media to filter misleading opinions on their platforms. As this is too altruistic to expect from different social media to self-enforce, we propose a mechanism design formulation that provides appropriate monetary incentives to social media leading to an efficient filter-wide system outcome. Our proposed mechanism incentivizes strategic social media to efficiently filter misleading information and thus indirectly prevent the ever-emergent phenomenon of fake news. In particular, we consider an economically inspired mechanism that designs an implementable Nash equilibrium of efficient filtering of misleading information in a game of selfish social media platforms. We also show that our mechanism is individual rational and budget balance, two key characteristics of a democratic society.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the last few years, political commentators have highlighted that we live in a post-truth era [1] , wherein the deluge of information available on the internet has made it extremely difficult to identify facts. This has lead to a tendency among individuals to form their opinions on the basis of believability of presented information rather than its truthfulness. The rise of a post-truth era is intertwined with the rise of social media on the internet. In fact, social media acts as a source for an increasing amount of the information received by an individual throughout the day. The beliefs of users in a social medium are very sensitive towards the content they are exposed to [2] . This, combined with the social media business models seeking to maximize member engagement, leads to a propagation of conspiratorial thinking across the users [3] .
The receptivity of social media towards conspiratorial ideas makes it an ideal terrain to conduct political misinformation campaigns [4] . Democratic institutions are especially vulnerable to disruption through opinion manipulation and misinformation campaigns. This is because stable democracies tend to rely on a common knowledge of who the political actors are and of what processes they can use to gain public support [5] . In contrast, citizens of democracies often have a contested knowledge on who should hold power and how they should wield the power. The introduction of This alternate information can reduce the amount of common knowledge across democracy if it becomes accepted belief among sections of citizens. For example, such disruptions can be found in the United States Elections [6] , and Brexit Campaign in 2016 [6] , where misinformation and allegations of Russian interference resulted in a large number of citizens mistrusting the results of democratic voting.
In this paper, we seek to develop a framework to analyze attacks on common knowledge in democracies using a mechanism-design framework [7] , [8] . Mechanism design has proved a useful mathematical framework widely utilized in areas of research such as communication networks [9] - [11] and power markets [12] , [13] . We consider that the citizens and various major social media in a democratic country together form a social network. Every citizen is considered to have a trust in the common knowledge, denoted by her belief, that takes values between two extremes. The lowermost extreme represents a complete lack of trust in common knowledge, while the uppermost extreme represents complete trust in the common knowledge. These agents use the social media to share their beliefs with other subscribers of the same social media and simultaneously, update their beliefs based on those of the other subscribers of the same social media. The social media are considered to be strategic agents that seek to maximize their engagement by allowing as many citizens as possible to express beliefs using their platform. The inherent assumption is that the social media have the technology to filter the beliefs that seek to reduce trust in common knowledge, but have no incentive to do so. Thus, we propose a mechanism design formulation by introducing a function that provides the public perception of a social media. We hypothesize that the government can spread information in the citizens to provide an absolute lower bound on the average public perception of all social media. In turn, this leads to the next stage average opinion of the citizens being greater than the previous stage average opinion.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We present a novel mechanism that incentivizes social media to filter misleading information via appropriate monetary payments while considering a simple model of opinion dynamics for the citizens. Our proposed indirect mechanism successfully incentivizes social media, is feasible on and off equilibrium, can be strongly implemented to an induced game, is individually rational, and budget balance. Finally, we show that there always exists at least one Nash equilibrium in our mechanism. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the mathematical description of the problem considered. We present and prove the properties of our proposed mechanism and derive the optimal allocation of filters in Section IV. Finally, in Section II we discuss our concluding remarks and identify directions for future extensions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND BACKGROUND

A. The System Model
In this section, we present a mathematical formulation for the strategic decision-making of social media as a decentralized mechanism design problem. We denote the set of social media by I = {1, . . . , I}, with I ∈ N. Each media i seeks to draw as much engagement as possible from a set of citizens J = {1, . . . , J}, with J ∈ N. Due to geographical, monetary or preference constraints, a citizen j ∈ J does not subscribe to all social media in the set I. The interactions between the citizens in J and social media in I are captured by matrix C of dimension I × J. Each entry c i,j of matrix C takes values in {0, 1}, where c i,j = 1 implies that citizen j is a subscriber of social media i, while c i,j = 0 implies that citizen j is not a subscriber of citizen j. We denote the set of subscribers of social media i by S i = {j ∈ J : c i,j = 1}.
Every citizen j ∈ J has some trust in the common knowledge on democracy, denoted by her belief x j ∈ [0, 1]. Citizen j attempts to broadcast her belief to all other citizens k ∈ J using various social media. The action of a social media i ∈ I is to select a content filter a i ∈ [0, 1]. The filter a i imposes that a subscriber j ∈ S i can broadcast her opinion on social media i only if x i ≥ a i .
The engagement of subscriber j ∈ S i with the social media i is denoted by e i,j ∈ [0, 1). For a citizen j ∈ S i , the engagement is given by e i,j = 0. Engagement can be thought of as a measure of the importance given by citizen j to social media i when updating her opinion. The filter a i of social media i has an impact on the engagement of the subscriber j. Explicitly, the updated engagement e + i,j of the citizen j ∈ J with media i ∈ I is given by
where I(·) is an indicator function and the function ε i (e i,j ) ≥ 0 ensures that e + i,j ≥ 0 by satisfying ε i (e i,j ) = 0 for e i,j = 0. Citizen j then receives the beliefs of the various other subscribers of the same social media. She assigns weights to the beliefs received through social media i ∈ I in accordance with her engagement with social media i. Thus, the updated belief of citizen j is given by
Meanwhile, a social media i ∈ I behaves like a strategic agent attempting to maximize the engagement it receives from its subscribers. Due to a lack of knowledge of the personal update models of the citizens, it may not be possible for the social media i to individually predict the updated engagement e + i,j for every subscriber j ∈ S i . However, the media can easily track the opinion x j and current total engagement e i = j∈J e i,j of its subscribers. Thus, the media i estimates the total loss in engagement using a differentiable function z i (c i,j , x j , a i : j ∈ J ). The estimated utility of social media i is given bŷ
Furthermore, the citizens have a perception of the social media i that is independent of their engagement. The perception of the social media i is denoted by the differentiable function
, which depends on its filter a i , the average opinionx i = j∈Si x j /|S j | of its subscribers in S i , and satisfies h i (0,x i ) = 0, for allx i ∈ [0, 1]. We impose the following assumptions on our problem formulation:
The engagement e i,j is positive for every citizen j ∈ J .
Assumption 1 considers that we are operating in a system that has scope for changes in engagement with the introduction of filters. Also, in this paper we do not consider the presence of stubborn citizens that never engage with other citizens to change their opinion.
Assumption 2. For every media i ∈ I, there is a subscriber j ∈ S i with the belief x j = 1.
Assumption 2 ensures that all values of filter a i ∈ [0, 1] are compatible with (2) . Assumption 2 can be relaxed by limiting filter a i to the maximum belief among the subscribers of social media i, or by considering more sophisticated dynamics for belief evolution.
Assumption 3. The total loss in engagement z i (c i,j , x j , a i : j ∈ J ) and perception h i (a i ,x i ) for media i ∈ I are both convex, differentiable, and strictly increasing with respect to the filter a i . Assumption 3 allows us to take advantage of Slater's condition [14] , which briefly says that in a convex optimization problem with a concave and differentiable objective function the duality gap is equal to zero and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee the optimality of any filter. Assumption 4 is necessary in our design of the mechanism. The private information of media i includes the current engagement e i , the set of its subscribers {j ∈ J : c i,j = 1}, the opinions of its subscribers {x j : j ∈ J , c i,j = 1}, and the functional form of the total loss in engagement z i (·). Note that the weighted average opinion of all citizens is given bȳ
B. Problem Statement
Along with the media, we introduce a social planner in our system, who seeks to increase the trust in democracy among citizens with low beliefs, considered to be victims of prior attacks on common knowledge. The social planner can achieve this if at all media i ∈ I implement a filter a i > a min > 0. Proposition 1. Let the filter a i > a min and let some citizen for all media i ∈ I. Then, for any citizen j ∈ S i with beliefs x j < a min , there is an increase in the belief after the update, i.e., x + j > x j .
Proof. The opinion x + j of the citizen j is given by (2) and Assumption 2 ensures that for all media i ∈ I, there is a citizen k ∈ S i with belief x k ≥ a i . Then, we can write the difference in opinion as
The social planner achieves this goal by spreading information among the citizens so that they enforce a lower bound κ ∈ [0, |I|] on the total perception of all social media in I. If we consider the social planner to be the government, this can be achieved by spreading awareness about the dangers of attacks on common knowledge among the citizens and then allowing the informed citizens to demand better filtering from all the social media.
Furthermore, in order to achieve socially optimal filters for social media in I, the social planner attempts to incentivize each social media i via monetary charges or subsidies as part of the payment function t i for their filter a i . Thus, the total utility of social media i is given by
where r i ∈ R >0 is the monetary value of the unit of engagement for media i and t i ∈ R is the monetary payment made (or subsidy received) by the media i to the social planner, both scaled appropriately. We refer to the first component of (6) as the valuation function
The social planner does not have access to the valuation function v i but knows that it is differentiable, concave, and strictly decreasing in a i . Thus, each media i seeks to maximize its own utility u i through its choice of filter a i , while the social planner is interested in solving the following problem:
The centralized optimization problem of the social planner's goal is given below (for each j ∈ J ):
subject to: 0 ≤ a i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I,
where inequality (7) expresses the bounds of the filter of media i, and inequality (8) provides a lower bound for the minimum total perception of all media. Solving this centralized optimization problem using standard optimization methods would require complete information.
The objective function of Problem 1 is differentiable, concave, and the set of feasible filters is non-empty, convex, and compact. Thus, Problem 1 has a unique solution, denoted by a * = (a * 1 , a * 2 , . . . , a * n ), and we refer it as the efficient outcome. Note that for a high enough value of the lower bound κ, the social planner can ensure that that Proposition 1 holds with a i > 0 for all i ∈ I.
III. SPECIFICATION OF THE MECHANISM DESIGN PROBLEM
An indirect mechanism can be described as a tuple of two components, namely M, g(·) . We denote the complete message space of all media in I by M = M 1 × · · · × M n , with the message of a media i ∈ I denoted by m i ∈ M i . The component g(·) is the outcome function given by g : M → O that maps each message profile to a set of outcomes of the form {(a 1 , . . . , a n ), (t 1 , . . . , t n ) | a i ∈ [0, 1], t i ∈ R}. gives the set of all possible filters and the payments paid or received by all social media. The outcome function g determines the outcome, namely g(m) for any given message profile m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) ∈ M. The payment function is t i : M → R and determines the monetary payment made or received by media i. In our setting, we explicitly define social media i's message as follows
wherer i ∈ R is a weight that social media i can manipulate to control the filter it seeks,x i ∈ [0, 1] is the reported average opinion of social media the subscribers in S i , and α i ∈ [0, ∞) is the price that social media i is willing to pay (or receive) per unit change in public perception. The proposed message ensures, in a sense of imposing a communication constraint, that the proposed mechanism is realistic by not requiring social media to fully reveal their private information to the social planner. Formally, a mechanism M, g(·) together with the utility functions (u i ) i∈I induces a game M, g(·), (u i ) i∈I . For such a game, we choose for our solution concept the Nash equilibrium (NE), defined as a message profile m * such that u i (g(m * i , m * −i )) ≥ u i (g(m i , m * −i )), for all m i ∈ M i and each i ∈ I, where m −i = (m 1 , . . . , m i−1 , m i+1 , . . . , m |I| ) denotes the message profile of all the social media except i ∈ I. Note that while the Nash equilibrium solution concept assumes complete information, we adopt it for our game with private information by using the interpretation that the social media can utilize an iterative learning process to find a NE in the induced game [15] . The next thing to note is that the messages defined in (9) are finite dimensional. Based on this, the social planner in our proposed mechanism can apply methodologies from surrogate optimization in the following way: the social planner uses the surrogate function v ′ i =r i ·[−ẑ(a i ,x i )] instead of the valuation function v i . The social planner selects a surrogate function such thatẑ(a i ,x i ) is convex, differentiable, and strictly increasing with respect to a i . So, we provide below the surrogate problem that the social planner seeks to solve: Problem 2. The indirect (decentralized) optimization problem is given below:
where the inequality (10) expresses the bounds of the filter of social media i, and h i (·) is the perception of the citizens of social media i's filter.
Problem 2 has a unique solution as the objective function is differentiable, concave, and the constraint set is nonempty, convex, and compact. Thus, Slater's conditions are satisfied [14] . Furthermore, the objective function is strictly decreasing with respect to the action a i . So, the solution of Problem 2 is well-defined and it gives the filter of each social media. Formally, the unique solution of Problem 2 is evaluated by the function f i : M → A, which the social planner announces to all social media. Next, we derive the Lagrangian and the KKT conditions of Problem 2:
. For a given message profile m ∈ M, (f i (m)) i∈I is the unique solution of Problem 2 if and only if it satisfies the feasibility conditions of Problem 2, and there exist Lagrange multipliers (λ i , µ i , ν : i ∈ I) so that the following KKT conditions are satisfied:
where the Lagrange multipliers are not all equal to zero at the same time.
Further, the social planner proposes monetary incentives to the social media in the form of payment functions (t i (m)) i∈I in order to elicit truthful messages of all social media i ∈ I. That way, the social planner successfully can induce a game with a NE that corresponds to the optimal solution f (m * ) of Problem 2, and subsequently a NE for the optimal filter of Problem 1.
We propose the following payment function:
Notice that the choice ofα i andx i do not affect the payment t i assigned to the social media i, while they are penalized for inconsistency in reporting those values by the second and third terms in (18). In order to ensure that the social media do not manipulate their payments, we penalize them for lying about every component of their message. Now, the second term inside the square brackets is a quotas imposed by the social planner (e.g., the government). Basically, each social media are charged to pay the "significant" excess of misleading opinions on their platform at a price suggested by the other social media. The second component attempts to reward social media i for trying to filter the misleading opinions on their platform. The payment of social media i is the externality or the decrease in social welfare that social media i imposes on all the other social media by its participation based on this revealed valuation function.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
In this section we show the desirable properties of our mechanism, starting with the fact that it has feasible outcomes on and off a NE. The first result focuses on feasibility, i.e., there exists a filter for which all constraints are satisfied. We have that (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) is a feasible solution to Problem 1 if it satisfies all the constraints (7) and (8) .
Lemma 1 (Feasibility). For an arbitrary message m, the unique solution of Problem 2, (f i ) i∈I , is a feasible solution of Problem 1.
Proof. For a solution to Problem 1 to be feasible, we need to satisfy the optimization constraints. Now, for any message profile m, the feasible set of Problem 2 is a subset of the feasible set of Problem 1. Therefore, f is a feasible point of Problem 1.
Notice that in Lemma 1 we do not specify whether the message profile m is an equilibrium or not. This is a significant property of our mechanism as on or off equilibrium the filters of all social media are feasible, i.e., satisfy the optimization constraints. Lemma 2. Let m * be a NE of the induced game. Then, α * i = ν * for all media i ∈ I, i.e., at NE, the price suggested by the media i is truthful.
Proof. Suppose that social media i attempts to deviate from m * with respect toα i and report m i = (α i ,r * i ,x * i ). By definition of NE, we have
which leads to
Substituting (18) into (21) yields
Equivalently, we get the minimization problem minα i (α i − ν * ) 2 for which ν * ≥ 0 implies that its optimal solution is α i =α * i = ν * for all i ∈ I. Lemma 3. Let m * be a NE of the induced game. Then, x * i = ∆(x * −i ) for all media i ∈ I, i.e., at NE, every media i has no incentive to lie aboutx i .
Proof. Suppose that one media i attempts to deviate from the message m * given by m * i = (α * i ,r * i ,x * i ) with respect tȭ x i . Hence, we have
Substituting (18) gives
which leads to minx i x i − ∆(x * −i ) 2 , where the optimal solution isx i =x * i = ∆(x * −i ) for all social media i ∈ I. Proof. Let us consider a fixed a i ∈ [0, 1] and a fixedr −i . We show that there exists at least oner i such that f i (m i , m −i ) = a i , where m * −i is fixed. First, we formulate the maximization problem of the sum of surrogate functions of all social media other than i, i.e., max a l : l =i l∈I : l =ir
Let the optimal solution of (26) be denoted by a * l , which implies that a * l satisfies the KKT conditions of (26) along with Lagrange multipliers (ξ i , o i , π). We have 1) For a i > 0, there existsr i ≥ −π · ∂ ∂a i (hi(ai,xi)) ∂ ∂a i (ẑ(xi,ai)) that ensures that f i (m) = a i .
2) For a i < 1, there existsr i ≤ −π · ∂ ∂a i (hi(ai,xi)) ∂ ∂a i (ẑ(xi,ai)) that ensures that f i (m) = a i . Hence, there exists somer i such that (a i , a * l ) along with (ξ i , o i , π) satisfies the KKT conditions of Problem 2, i.e., f i (m i , m −i ) = a i . Thus, the result follows immediately. Lemma 4 allows any social media i to unilaterally deviate from a NE message m * to achieve any feasible filter. But as m * is a NE of the induced game, there should not be any incentive to deviate. Thus, the maximization of social media i's utility should be the solution of the following:
Note that the objective function of (27) is concave because for every i ∈ I, we have a non-negative price α i ≥ 0. This implies that any solution of (27) is unique. We note that in the absence of Lemma 4 the rate f i (m * ) at NE could be different from the optimal rate that maximizes the valuation function of social media i over all feasible rates. Next, we show that our proposed mechanism fully implements the optimal solution of Problem 1 at NE. 
It is straightforward to verify that (28) satisfies the KKT conditions of Problem 1. Therefore, we conclude that a * i = f i (m * ).
Next, we show that our mechanism ensures that there always exists at least one NE.
Theorem 2 (NE existence). Let a * i be the unique optimal solution of Problem 1. If for all i ∈ I
then m = (m i ) i∈I = m * is a NE of the induced game.
Proof. Consider the message given by (29) for each social media i. We can then ensure, for Problem 2, that the optimal filters are f i (m) = a * i , with the corresponding Lagrange multipliers given by {λ i = χ i , µ i = ψ i , ν = ω : i ∈ I}. Note that the set of Lagrange multipliers {χ i , µ i , ω : i ∈ I} is consistent with the optimal solution a * i of Problem 1. Next, we need to show that there exist Lagrange multipliers
that ensure that a * i satisfies the condition (27) for all social media i ∈ I. Let any social media i to unilaterally deviate and have message m ′ i while the messages of all other social media m −i are consistent with (29). For social media i the termsα −i = ν andx l in their payment function depend on m l for all l ∈ I \ {i}. Hence, we construct the Lagrange multipliers for social media i as
It follows that the KKT conditions for (27) are satisfied, and so m * i is the best response for social media i to the message m * −i . Thus, the message profile m * is a NE. Theorem 3 (Individually Rational). The proposed mechanism is individually rational, i.e., each media i ∈ I prefers the outcome of every NE of the induced game to the outcome of not participating.
Proof. Consider any NE message m * . By Lemma 4, given m * −i = (α * −i ,r * −i ,x * −i ), for each media i there exists m i = (α i ,r i ,x i ) withr i = 0 such that f i (m i , m * −i ) = 1 (as we are interested in the lowest utility). Based on this, by definition of NE and given media i's utility function (6) , it follows that u i (g(m * )) ≥ u i (g(m i , m * −i )).
Note that h i (f i (m), ·) is a strictly increasing function and reaches its maximum when f i (m) = 1, so h i (f i (m) = 1, ·) = 1. As media i deviates only inr i , we get
Hence,
where l∈I\{i} h l (f l (m * −i ),x l ) ≤ 1. Thus, the second component of (35) is positive. By not participating (i.e., no payment), media i gets at most a benefit of v i (a i = 1) but in (35) we have added a positive number to the utility of social media i for participating and considering the worstcase scenario. Therefore, the result follows immediately.
Theorem 4 (Budget Balance). Consider any NE m * of the induced game. Then, the proposed mechanism is budget balanced, i.e., i∈I t i (m * ) = 0.
Proof. Let m * be a NE. By Lemmas 2 and 3, after some algebraic simplification, we obtain i∈I t i (m * ) = ν * · 1 |I| − 1 Denote β i = h i (f i (m * ), ∆(x * −i )). Then j∈I\{i} β j = i∈I β i − β i . It is straightforward to show now that i∈I j∈I\{i} β j = (n − 1) i∈I β i .
(37)
Thus, it follows that i∈I t i (m * ) = 0 at equilibrium.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we studied the incentivization of social media to filter citizens' misleading information on their platforms. We designed a mechanism that induces a game with a Nash equilibrium with the following desirable properties: social media truthfully report messages to the social planner, a Nash equilibrium always exists and is strongly implementable and the optimal filter for all social media is feasible on or off the equilibrium, are voluntarily willing to participate, all monetary exchanges result in a balanced budget. The last two properties ensure the applicability of our mechanism in a democratic society. In future work, we plan to explore theoretical developments extending this paper to more general mechanisms with sophisticated opinion dynamics in dynamic and robust mechanism design settings.
